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1 Introduction 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is widely viewed as beneficial for growth and job creation in 
the destination countries as it finances domestic investment and can be a vehicle for 
productivity growth through the use and dissemination of advanced production techniques 
and management skills. Compared with short-term credits and portfolio investments, FDI is 
much more stable and resilient to changes in economic environment. For these reasons, 
countries have tried to attract FDI. Therefore, the really important question is what countries 
can do to attract more of inward FDI. 
 
Many theoretical and empirical studies have suggested various factors that influence location 
choices of investment by multinational enterprises (MNEs). Some are firm-level 
characteristics while others are country-level characteristics, which in turn can be either host 
country characteristics or home country characteristics. For instance, Helpman, Melitz and 
Yeaple (2004) suggest that a firm’s relative productivity plays a major role in the MNEs’ 
investment decision-making process because only more productive firms can earn enough 
operating profits to recoup the high sunk costs of investing in a foreign country. Yeaple (2009) 
further extends this insight to propose theoretically that countries with a more favorable 
investment environment attract a larger number of MNEs. Using cross-sectional data on 
outward FDI from the U.S., Yeaple (2009) empirically confirms that countries with better 
investment environments attract more U.S. MNEs.1 Hayakawa, Lee, and Park (2010) confirm 
this finding: using a firm-level database of outward FDI from Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, they 
show that host countries with better environments for FDI, in terms of larger market size and 
smaller fixed entry costs, attract more foreign investors. Thus, the quality of a host country’s 
investment environment is very important in attracting FDI. They also examine the role of 
home country characteristics in FDI by showing that firms from home countries with higher 
wages are more likely to invest abroad. 
 
This paper focuses on host country characteristics. This is an interesting topic, as while 
virtually all countries now compete vigorously for FDI inflows, the distribution of those 
inflows is far from uniform. While some countries pull in enormous amounts of FDI inflows, 
other countries such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa lag far behind. Therefore, it is important 
for FDI-seeking policymakers to have a good grasp of the underlying drivers of the MNEs’ 
location decisions in order to attract inward FDI. 
 
In particular, this paper focuses on country risk which is closely related with the level of 
business risk. It seems intuitively plausible to believe that a sound institutional environment 
(efficient bureaucracy, low corruption, secure property rights, etc.) should attract more FDI. 
Likewise, higher business risk due to high country risk of the host countries would 
discourage foreign investment by multinationals.  
 
Nonetheless, evidence remains mixed.2 For instance, Asiedu (2002) concludes that neither 
political risk nor expropriation risk has any significant impact on FDI. Noorbaksh et al (2001) 
 
1 He also shows that more productive MNEs can invest in a larger number of countries because those 
firms can cover the higher total sunk costs associated with investing in a larger number of separate 
foreign markets. 
2 See Blonigen (2005) for a complete survey. 
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also report that democracy and political risk are not significantly related to FDI. Wheeler and 
Mody (1992) in their analysis of firm-level U.S. data find no significant result for corruption 
in the host country. 
 
However, there are also a number of papers which find that institutional quality (political risk) 
has a positive (negative) impact on FDI flows. For instance, with a sample of 22 developing 
countries, Gastanaga et al (1998) find that lower corruption and nationalization risk levels 
and better contract enforcement are associated with greater FDI flows. Wei (2000) also finds 
that corruption significantly impedes FDI inflows.  
 
Kolstad and Tondel (2002) find that FDI flows are affected by ethnic tension, internal conflict, 
and democracy, but not by government stability, bureaucracy, external conflict, law and order, 
and military in politics. For a sample of 83 developing countries, Busse and Hefeker (2007) 
find that government stability, internal and external conflict, corruption, ethnic tensions, law 
and order, democratic accountability of government, and quality of bureaucracy are highly 
significant determinants of FDI flows.  
 
Lee and Rajan (2009) find that APEC member countries with lower country risk appear to 
attract more FDI inflows. Particularly, they find that the most important component of this 
risk pertains to political risk (as opposed to financial or economic risk).  
 
Ali, et al (2010) also find that institutions are a robust predictor of FDI and that property 
rights security is the most important aspect of institutions in determining FDI flows. 
Specifically, they find that institutions have a significant impact on FDI in manufacturing and 
in services but that institutional quality does not matter for FDI in the primary sector. Walsh 
and Yu (2010) also find a similar result: while FDI flows into the primary sector show little 
dependence on institutions, secondary and tertiary sector investments are marginally affected 
by institutions, but only in advanced economies. 
 
As summarized above, most previous studies focus on one aggregate measure of political risk 
or institutional quality. However, country risk is not a single factor, but rather a composite 
concept. Broadly, country risk relates not only with political risk but also with financial risk, 
which refers to a country’s ability to repay its foreign liabilities. As will be discussed in the 
following section, there are strong reasons to believe that high financial risk deters FDI flows.  
 
Therefore, this paper tries to identify those political and financial risk components that matter 
most for investment decision making by multinationals. Specifically, this paper aims to assess 
the impact on inward FDI of various components of political and financial risks, using 
indices sourced from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) provided by the Political 
Risk Services (PRS) Group.3 Our paper is the first paper to comprehensively examine the 
impact of various components of not only political risk but also financial risk on inward FDI.  
  
For political risk, we examine the influences of government stability, socioeconomic 
conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, military in 
 
3 http://www.prsgroup.com/  
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politics, religious tensions, law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, and 
bureaucracy quality.4 For financial risk, foreign debt as a percentage of GDP, foreign debt 
service as a percentage of exports of goods and services, current account as a percentage of 
exports of goods and services, net international liquidity as months of import cover, inflation 
rate, budget balance as a percentage of GDP, and current account as a percentage of GDP will 
be considered. 
 
We use the overall FDI inflow data for 93 countries (including 60 developing countries), 
drawn from UNCTAD’s FDI Online database. Our sample period runs from 1985 to 2007. 
Noting that evidence on the relationship between institutions (political risk) and FDI remains 
mixed, we will employ four different empirical specifications which are either most 
commonly used by other researchers or are theoretically more comprehensive. In particular, 
we employ a partial adjustment model so as to assess the effects of country risk from both 
long-run and short-run perspectives. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
country risk and its relation with FDI. In Section 3, we describe the empirical framework we 
employ to investigate the impact of country risk on FDI. In Section 4, we report and discuss 
our main empirical results. Section 5 brings the paper to a close with a summary and some 
policy implications. 
 
 
2. Discussions on the Relationship between Country Risk and FDI 
 
As discussed under Introduction, country risk is a composite concept that relates not only 
with political risk but also with financial risk. 
 
2.1. Political Risk and FDI 
 
Political risk refers to the quality of institutional environment. That is, political risk is the risk 
that the returns to investment may suffer as a result of low institutional quality and political 
instability. There are many reasons to believe that sound institutional quality and low political 
instability (and hence low political risk) should attract more FDI.  
 
High sunk costs of FDI makes investors highly sensitive to uncertainty (Helpman, Melitz and 
Yeaple, 2004). Such sunk costs include the cost of acquiring information so as to overcome 
the lack of knowledge and familiarity with the country. Institutions reduce uncertainty 
associated with human interaction by providing societies with a predictable framework for 
interaction (Ali et al, 2010). Without sound institutions, there would be substantial 
uncertainties in economic exchanges, and a risk premium will be included in sunk costs to 
capture these possibilities. In an extremely poor institutional environment and hence under 
very high political risk, multinationals may suspect that the host country’s government might 
appropriate some of the returns on FDI or even implement enforced nationalization.  
 
 
4 A number of these political risk components are also closely associated with the quality of political 
institutions and hence political risk and institutional quality have been treated interchangeably by a 
number of authors (eg., Busse, 2007 and Ali et al, 2010).  
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Inefficient institutions and high political risk can also adversely affect operating costs. 
Excessive red-tape or lengthy delays in obtaining permits can greatly increase production 
costs of foreign firms. Common forms of corruption such as demands for special payments 
and bribes connected with import and export licenses, ex exchange controls, tax assessments, 
or police protection can make it difficult to conduct foreign business effectively. 
 
In contrast, local competitors or partners, due to better access to the political process, may 
persuade the government to favor them at the expense of foreign investors, thus reducing the 
competitiveness of multinationals.  
 
Thus, political risk can adversely affect foreign business in many ways. 
 
2.2. Financial Risk and FDI 
 
Financial risk refers to the risk that a country may not be able to repay its foreign liabilities. 
Without doubt, countries with high financial risk are more likely to face an abrupt financial 
crisis. Unlike short-term bank loans and portfolio investment, FDI cannot be easily 
withdrawn when the financial situation of the host country changes. Therefore, foreign firms 
might be very sensitive to financial risk of the host country.5  
 
As the amount of foreign debt increases relative to the borrowing country’s GDP, the 
country’s ability to repay its debt will decline and financial risk of the country will increase. 
Therefore, multinationals may find the countries with too much foreign debt less attractive 
for investment, ceteris paribus. A country’s foreign debt and its financial risk will tend to 
increase gradually if the country experiences a large amount of chronic current account 
deficit for many years. The government’s chronic deficit in budget balance may also lead to 
an increase in its foreign debt and financial risk.  
 
Exchange rate instability of the host country may also deter FDI as it increases uncertainty in 
the financial plans of MNEs. A high inflation rate in the host country may also deter foreign 
investment as the real local currency value of capital already invested and future return may 
become smaller with high inflation. High inflation can also lower the home country-currency 
value of FDI as the currency value of the host country is likely to become weaker against 
other currencies. 
 
2.3. Political and Financial Risk Indices 
 
As noted earlier, information on political and financial risk is drawn from the ICRG provided 
by the PRS Group. One advantage of using the ICRG ratings is that they are widely used by 
multinational corporations, institutional investors, banks, importers, exporters, foreign 
exchange traders, and others. 
 
The ICRG rating comprises 22 variables in three categories of risk: political, financial, and 
economic. A separate index is created for each of the subcategories. The Political Risk index 
is based on 100 points, Financial Risk on 50 points, and Economic Risk on 50 points.  
 
5 Obviously, which type of investment, i.e., FDI, portfolio investment, or bank loans, is more 
sensitive to financial risk is another interesting research topic. 
 
Political Risk 
 
The Political Risk Rating includes 12 subcomponents covering both political and social 
attributes. The table below summarizes the 12 components of political risk with their 
abbreviations. To ensure comparability among the components and easier interpretation of the 
results in the regressions, we rescaled the components from 0 to 10, with higher values 
indicating less political risk (better institutions). Note that originally, different components 
were assessed on different scales as shown in Appendix 2. Detailed explanations on each 
component of political risk are also provided in Appendix 2. 
 
 
POLITICAL RISK COMPONENTS 
Abbreviation Component Points 
(max.) 
Gov_stab Government Stability 10 
Socioec Socioeconomic Conditions 10 
Inv_prof Investment Profile 10 
Int_conf Internal Conflict 10 
Ext_conf External Conflict 10 
Corruption Corruption 10 
Military Military in Politics 10 
Religion Religious Tensions 10 
Law_order Law and Order 10 
Ethnic_ten Ethnic Tensions 10 
Dem_acct Democratic Accountability 10 
Bur_qual Bureaucracy Quality 10 
 
 
Financial Risk 
The overall aim of the ICRG financial risk rating is to measure a country’s ability to finance 
its official, commercial, and trade debt obligations. Therefore, the ICRG financial risk rating 
can be considered as an indicator of a country’s likelihood of having a financial crisis in the 
coming years. Originally, the ICRG financial risk rating had five subcomponents. 
As seen in Appendix 2, ICRG originally also reported the economic risk rating based on five 
subcomponents: GDP per capita, real GDP growth rate, annual inflation rate, budget balance 
as a percentage of GDP, and current account as a percentage of GDP. GDP per capita and 
real GDP growth are the usual determinants of FDI flows in most studies. We also include 
them as control variables. Budget balance as a percentage of GDP and current account as a 
percentage of GDP are related with financial risk as a larger amount of budget deficit and 
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current account deficit is very likely to lead to a greater debt obligation of the country and 
hence a lower ability for the country to repay its debt. Inflation rate is also related with 
financial risk as noted above. 
Therefore, we do not consider the above five risk components as one single kind of risk.  
Instead, we include the last three components of the original economic risk rating of ICRG 
also as subcomponents of financial risk. The table below summarizes the eight 
subcomponents of financial risk considered in this study. Another point to note is that unlike 
the original ICRG rating, the inflation component here is a 3-year moving average of the 
original inflation component. Again, we have rescaled the components from 0 to 10. 
 
FINANCIAL RISK COMPONENTS
Abbreviation Component Points 
(max.)
For_debt Foreign Debt as a Percentage of GDP 10
Debt_serv Foreign Debt Service as a Percentage of Exports of Goods and Services 10
Caxgs Current Account as a Percentage of Exports of Goods and Services 10
Intl_liq Net International Liquidity as Months of Import Cover 10
Xr_stab Exchange Rate Stability 10
Inflation Annual Inflation Rate (three year average) 10
Bud_bal Budget Balance as a Percentage of GDP 10
Cacc Current Account as a Percentage of GDP 10
 
 
Obviously, all 12 political risk components are related to each other by varying degrees, as all 
assess political risk from a different angle. All 8 financial risk components are also related to 
each other for the same reason. In fact, political risk indicators and financial risk components 
are also related to each other by a large degree. 
 
Because of multicollinearity between the risk components in many cases, most researchers 
have addressed this in their regression analysis by establishing a baseline specification to 
control for the usual determinants and then adding each of the institution (risk) variables in 
turn. We follow this approach. 
 
2.4. Partial Correlations between Country Risk and FDI 
 
As discussed under Introduction, we use the overall FDI inflow data for 93 countries, drawn 
from UNCTAD’s FDI Online database. The list of countries can be found in Appendix 1. Our 
sample period covers from 1985 to 2007. In order to show simple correlations between 
country risk and FDI, we obtained the average values of political risk and financial risk 
during the sample period and examined their partial correlation with the average values of 
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annual FDI inflows during the same period. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the scatter diagram of 
points between country risk (political and financial) and FDI inflows. A predicted regression 
line is also shown in each diagram.   
 
As can be seen in the figures, there seems to be a very strong association between both type 
of country risk and FDI. Thus, countries with large annual FDI inflows are those with low 
political and financial risk. Two points are worth noting. First, the above relationship is cross-
sectional and such relationship does not show causality. Second, the close association 
between FDI and political (and financial) risk may be due to the fact that political and 
financial risks are highly associated with other variables which are also highly associated 
with FDI. For example, countries with high income level tend to have low country risk and 
large FDI flows, and hence without controlling for such effect the close association between 
FDI flows and country risk maybe superficial. 
 
 
3. Empirical Specification. 
 
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is worth outlining some data issues. The most 
common definition of FDI is based on the OECD Benchmark Definition of FDI (3rd Edition, 
1996) and IMF Balance of Payments Manual (5th Edition, 1993). According to this definition, 
FDI generally bears two broad characteristics. First, as a matter of convention, FDI involves a 
10 percent threshold value of ownership.6 Second, FDI consists of both the initial transaction 
that creates (or liquidates) investments as well as subsequent transactions between the direct 
investor and the direct investment enterprises aimed at maintaining, expanding, or reducing 
investments.  
 
We use the overall FDI inflows as our dependent variable, drawn from the UNCTAD FDI 
database. In this case, FDI refers to the definition from OECD/IMF mentioned above (i.e., 
foreign investments for which foreign firms own 10% or more of the local enterprise).  
 
Some of the observations for FDI flows are negative in some specific years. FDI flows can 
vary significantly from year to year, partly due to one or a few large investment projects, 
especially in small-size developing countries. Therefore, we use 3-year averages for the 
period from 1985 to 2007. That is, we use the 3-year averages of FDI inflows for 1985-1987, 
1990-1992, 1995-1997, 2000-2002, and 2005-2007. To allow for some time lags, the data for 
the explanatory variables are used for the beginning year of each sub-period. That is, the data 
for 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005 are used for explanatory variables. 
 
Choosing the set of control variables is somewhat problematic because the empirical 
literature suggests a large number of variables as potential determinants of FDI and various 
theories of FDI do not seem to agree on a fixed set of determinants. Regarding the control 
 
6 This said, the 10 percent threshold is not always adhered to by all economies systematically. For a 
detailed overview of the FDI definitions and coverage in selected developing and developed 
economies, see IMF (2003). UNCTAD (2007) discusses data issues pertaining to FDI inflows to 
China. 
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variables in the regression, we choose the most common, yet not too many, variables, 
following other researchers. 
 
GDP per capita (log): this is to capture the level of income and wages of the host country. A 
high level of income means a greater demand for goods and services, which attracts market-
seeking FDI. On the other hand, a high level of income may also mean a high wage rate, 
which may deter labor-seeking FDI. Therefore, whether GDP per capita attracts or deters FDI 
is an empirical question.   
 
Growth rate of GDP per capita: this is to capture the growth potential, which attracts 
market-seeking FDI as it may signal high investment returns.7 
 
Total population (log): this is to capture the influence of the market size of the host economy, 
which may indicate the attractiveness of a specific location for the investment when a foreign 
firm aims to produce for the local market (horizontal or market-seeking FDI). For example, 
Resmini (2000) finds that countries in Central and Eastern Europe with larger populations 
tend to attract more FDI. 
 
Growth rate of total population: similar to growth rate of GDP per capita, this is to capture 
the growth potential, which attracts market-seeking FDI.  
 
Degree of free trade: this is to measure the influence of trade restrictiveness on FDI. This is 
an index of free trade (Item 4: Freedom to Trade Internationally) taken from Fraser Institute’s 
Economic Freedom of the World8. Its value ranges from zero, indicating highest trade 
restrictiveness, to one hundred, indicating greatest freedom to trade internationally (i.e., 
lowest trade restrictiveness). Foreign firms engaged in export-oriented investment or vertical 
FDI may favor investing in a country with lower trade barriers, since trade barriers increase 
transaction costs. In contrast, horizontal FDI may be attracted by higher trade barriers, which 
also protect the output of the foreign investor in the local market against imports of 
competitors (tariff-jumping hypothesis) (Ali et al., 2010).9  
 
Stock of FDI (log): this is to capture the clustering effects. That is, a larger existing FDI 
stock is regarded as a signal of a benign business climate for foreign investors, and new 
foreign investors may benefit from the presence of external scale economies by mimicking 
past investment decisions by other investors. Evidence of these effects is pervasive (for 
instance, Walsh and Yu, 2010). Multinationals may also see the considerable FDI stocks or 
FDI inflows in the previous period as the success of other multinationals and hence may be 
attracted to the countries for further investments. 
 
Equation (1) below is our baseline equation to be estimated to assess the impact of country 
 
7 A high growth rate of GDP per capita may also mean a high growth rate of wages of local 
workers. Therefore, countries with high growth rates of GDP per capita may not attract 
more FDI. 
8 http://www.freetheworld.com/release.html 
9 Some authors use the ratio of goods and services trade to GDP to capture the trade restrictiveness 
(eg., Busse and Efeker, 2007; Ali, et al., 2010; and Walsh and Yu, 2010). Even though they are closely 
related, the former is to capture the influence of trade openness of the host economy on FDI. We also 
tried this variable but found that the results were inferior to our trade restrictiveness index. 
risk on FDI flows: 
 
FDIit = α + β1CVit + β2RISKit + ui + ut + εijt                                           (1) 
 
where FDI is the log of FDI inflows, CV is a vector of control variables described above,  
RISK is a country risk variable, ui is a country dummy, ut is a year dummy, and εij is an error 
term. 
 
As mentioned above, the three year average of FDI is regressed on the control variables and 
the risk variable which are measured in the beginning year of the three years so as to allow 
for some time lag between FDI and the explanatory variables. 
 
However, the country risk variables and the trade restrictiveness index may be affected by the 
future flows of FDI, because in an effort to bring more FDI the governments may try to make 
the business environment of their country more favorable by reducing their country risk and 
trade restrictiveness. Another problem with estimating Equation (1) with the usual fixed 
effects model is that it may involve autocorrelation of the disturbances and hence the 
estimated coefficients are biased. The problem of autocorrelation can be significantly reduced 
by including the lagged dependent variable on the right hand side of the regression 
equation.10 This procedure is also theoretically plausible as the foreign investment in the 
previous period is highly relevant for FDI in the current period because of the clustering 
effect described above. By construction, however, the unobserved panel-level effects are 
correlated with the lagged dependent variables, making standard estimators inconsistent. 
 
In order to account for the above mentioned problems, some authors (eg. Busse and Hefeker, 
2007 and Walsh and Yu, 2010) employ the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
dynamic estimator of Arellano-Bond methodology. The usual Arellano-Bond estimator is to 
run the regression using as instruments the first differences of the lagged values of the left 
and right hand side variables. In a sample of few periods with some persistent explanatory 
variables, the usual Arellano-Bond estimator can perform poorly. Blundell and Bond (1998) 
developed a system GMM estimator that uses an additional moment condition. We employ 
this estimator as an alternative specification to the fixed effects model described in Equation 
(1). In the case of the GMM estimator, we do not include country dummies because the fixed 
effects are eliminated using the first differences and an instrumental variable estimation of the 
difference equation is performed.  
 
One may also be interested in how differently the country risk affects the FDI inflows over 
time. In other words, even though the current level of country risk is still high, a large 
improvement in the level of country risk can invite a greater amount of FDI by signaling to 
foreign investors that this country is moving fast in reforming its business environment.  
 
Therefore, we also run a separate specification which differentiates the long-run and short- 
run effect of the country risk. Suppose that the steady state of log of FDI inflows into country i 
at time t is *itFDI ; then, the relationship between the actual and the steady state of itFDI  may 
be specified as follows: 
                                          
10 In this case, the FDI stock should be dropped as part of the FDI stock is the FDI flows in the 
previous period and both account for the clustering effects. 
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 *1 1( ) (it it it tFDI FDI FDI FDIδ− −− = −                             (2) 
 
One formulation assumes that *itFDI  is determined by the level forms of the determinants of 
FDI in period t-1 as well as the difference forms (which incorporate changes in the long-run 
extent of FDI between periods t-1 and t). Thus, the equation for changes in FDI is 
 
 1 1 1 1 2 1( ) ( )it it it it it it i t itFDI FDI FDI X X Xδ λ λ− − − −− = − + + − + εμ +μ +                (3) 
 
where X is a vector of explanatory variables which include both control variables and risk 
variables, as described in Equation (1).11  
 
Equation (3) can be rewritten as follows. 
 
 1 1 1 2 1(1 ) ( )it it it it it i t itFDI FDI X X Xδ λ λ− − −= − + + − + εμ +μ +                        (4) 
 
Therefore, by estimating Equation (3) or (4) we can assess how differently FDI flows are 
affected by the initial level of country risk and by changes in the level of country risk. That is, 
we can isolate the short-run effect of the country risk (and other control variables) from its 
long-run effect.  
 
It should be noted, however, that by including a lagged dependent variable on the right hand 
side of the regression equations, the error term of Equations (3) and (4) may be correlated 
again with the lagged dependent variables, making standard estimators inconsistent. 
Therefore, we also estimate Equation (4) using the system GMM estimator of Blundell and 
Bond (1998).  
 
Thus, we will run four different specifications: Equation (1) with fixed effects; Equation (1) 
with the system GMM estimator; Equation (3) with fixed effects; and Equation (4) with the 
system GMM estimator. 
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1. Aggregate Effects of Political Risk and Financial Risk 
 
The results for the aggregate effects of political risk and financial risk estimated by the four 
different specifications are reported separately in Tables 1-4. The first two columns in each 
table report the results when the whole sample is used, while the last two columns report the 
results for developing countries only. It should be necessary to differentiate developing 
countries because developing countries tend to receive different types of FDI, mostly vertical 
FDI, compared to developed countries with horizontal FDI.  
 
The results from the baseline regression with fixed effects are reported in Table 1. Columns 
(1) and (3) report the results without country risk variables, and Columns (2) and (4) report 
                                          
11 This is a partial adjustment model that can be found in Stone and Lee (1995). 
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the results with country risk variables. 
 
Let us first focus on Column 1, which reports the results without country risk variables when 
using the whole sample of both developed and developing countries. Among the various 
explanatory variables, two variables stand out as statistically significant. First, the clustering 
effects are visible here with a positive and significant coefficient on FDI stock. Second, the 
variable measuring the degree of free trade enters with a statistically positive coefficient. 
Given that some FDI is intended to serve domestic markets while other FDI flows are aimed 
at export markets, the positive coefficient for freedom of trade suggests that FDI flows 
aiming at exports are greater than FDI flows aiming at domestic markets.  
 
On the other hand, GDP per capita does not appear to attract or deter FDI. One may argue 
that this is so because of the two countervailing effects of FDI as noted earlier. That is, high 
wage rates of richer countries may deter labor-seeking FDI, while greater demand may attract 
market-seeking FDI. The size of economy in terms of total population also does not appear to 
matter for FDI flows. Market prospects in terms of either income growth or population 
growth do not seem to affect FDI inflows. 
 
When the political risk index and the financial risk index are included (Column 2), a positive 
and highly significant coefficient is obtained for political risk, which suggests that high 
political risk of the host countries deters FDI inflows. In contrast, the financial risk variable 
does not appear to have any linkages with FDI flows.  
 
When only developing countries are included in the sample (Columns 3 and 4), the 
qualitative results are similar but there are some differences with respect to the size of the 
estimated coefficients. For instance, clustering effects seem smaller in the case of developing 
countries, as the size of coefficient for FDI stock is smaller with the sample of developing 
countries only. On the other hand, freedom of trade seems to matter more in developing 
countries, as evidenced with a greater coefficient for freedom of trade in the equations for the 
sample of developing countries only. The effect of political risk also seems greater in 
developing countries, as the point estimate of the coefficient for the political risk index is 
greater in the sample of developing countries. 
 
Table 2 reports the results from estimating Equation (1) with the dynamic GMM estimator. 
The consistency of the dynamic GMM estimator requires the presence of first-order 
correlation and a lack of second-order correlation in the residuals of the differenced 
specification. All results except for the one with country risk variables in the sample for 
developing countries pass the Arellano-Bond test of first-order correlation and all results 
except for the one without country risk variables in the whole sample (Column 2) pass the 
Arellano-Bond test of second-order correlation. The overall appropriateness of the 
instruments can be verified by a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions. Indeed, the 
Sargan test reveals that the results of the GMM estimator for the sample of developing 
countries are not appropriate. Thus, we do not interpret the results from the dynamic GMM 
estimator as being better than those from the fixed effects model. Instead, we present the 
results from both specifications to check the robustness of the baseline results.   
 
The clustering effects continue to be visible. On the other hand, the variable measuring the 
degree of free trade is no longer statistically significant, even though it has positive 
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coefficients in all columns. In contrast, GDP per capita enters with a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient when the whole sample is used, and population yields a statistically 
significant coefficient when only developing countries are included in the sample. 
 
Interestingly, political risk continues to matter, while financial risk does not. Thus, we have 
strong evidence that political risk is a robust determinant of FDI flows. 
 
When comparing the sizes of the coefficients, the clustering effects seem larger in the 
developing countries than in the developing countries, while the effect of political risk seems 
smaller in the developing countries. This finding is opposite to what we found in Table 1, 
which reports the results from the fixed effects model. 
 
Table 3 reports the results when the partial adjustment model (Equation 3) is estimated with 
fixed effects. In this case, the dependent variable is the growth rate of FDI inflows. Indeed, as 
noted earlier, even when the log of FDI is used as the dependent variable, the estimates 
should be the same, except for the lagged FDI inflows. 
 
In all columns, the coefficient on the initial level of FDI flows is negative and significant at 
the one percent level, indicating that FDI growth rate is lower for the countries with a high 
level of FDI flows in the previous period, which is consistent with expectations. The size of 
the coefficient, being close to one, indicates that the speed of adjustment is very high. 
 
Both GDP per capita in the previous period and growth of GDP per capita during the past five 
years have statistically significant coefficients in most columns. This suggests that countries 
with large market size and high growth potential attract more FDI. However, we find a 
somewhat contradictory result with the initial size of population which carries a significant 
negative coefficient in the sample of developing countries only. 
 
In all columns, the coefficients both for the initial level of free trade and for a change in the 
level of free trade during the past five years are positive and significant. This suggests not 
only that the countries with a greater level of free trade receive a greater amount of FDI but 
also that the countries which have been successful in reducing trade restrictiveness by a larger 
extent receive a greater amount of FDI, ceteris paribus.         
 
On the other hand, the initial level of political risk matters only when the developing 
countries are included in the sample, while the change in the level of political risk matters 
either when all countries or when only developing countries are included in the sample. Thus, 
political risk appears to have both long-run and short-run effects on FDI in the case of 
developing countries. In contrast, when developing countries only are included in the sample, 
the initial level of and the change in the level of financial risk enter with negative coefficients 
which are statistically significant.  
 
Unlike the political risk index, the financial risk index enters with negative coefficients (both 
level and change). This is surprising, counterintuitive, and puzzling because the results 
indicate that countries with greater financial risk receive greater amounts of FDI. We do not 
interpret these results by suggesting that countries should increase financial risk to attract 
more FDI. Instead, we can say that multinationals do not consider seriously the financial risk 
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of the host country, and hence the benefit in reducing financial risk is minimal in attracting 
additional FDI.  
 
Table 4 reports the results when the dynamic GMM estimator is applied to the partial 
adjustment model. The initial level of FDI inflows has a significant effect on the current level 
of FDI inflows, again suggesting clustering effects. The initial level of GDP per capita has a 
significant positive effect on FDI inflows but the effect seems weaker in developing countries. 
GDP growth rate also has a significant positive effect on FDI inflows, and again the effect 
seems weaker in developing countries. On the other hand, the initial level of total population, 
which proxies the economic size, has a negative coefficient in the sample of developing 
countries. Nonetheless, population growth rate has positive impact on FDI flows. 
 
Focusing on the results for the political risk and financial risk variables, we observe that the 
initial level of political risk does not appear to affect FDI inflows, while the change in the 
level of political risk does. Thus, it appears that even where the initial level of political risk is 
high, a greater reduction in political risk can help the country attract greater FDI. Unlike the 
political risk index, the financial risk index enters with negative coefficients (both level and 
change), even though they are not statistically significant at any conventional level of 
significance. Thus, as noted above, multinationals do not seem to consider seriously the 
financial risk of the host country.  
 
It should be noted, however, that the results in the sample for developing countries do not 
pass the Arellano-Bond test of first-order correlation and the Sargan tests for overidentifying 
restrictions provide evidence of invalidity of the choice instruments in the case of the sample 
for developing countries, and therefore the results from the GMM estimator for developing 
countries should be interpreted with caution. 
 
4.2. Effects of Different Components of Political Risk and Financial Risk 
 
Table 5 reports the effects of different components of political risk on FDI, obtained from 
running 12 different regressions in four different specifications for the whole sample and for 
developing countries, respectively, while controlling for other variables specified above. Thus, 
the results are from 96 different regressions (= 12 X 4 X 2). 
 
When using the whole sample, among the 12 political risk components, government stability, 
socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, external conflict, religious 
tensions, democratic accountability, and ethnic tensions enter with statistically significant 
positive point estimates. Socioeconomic conditions seem to matter the most in attracting FDI 
as the size of this component’s point estimate is the largest and statistically significant in all 
four specifications. Investment profile and external conflict are the second most influential 
components of political risk in attracting foreign investment. In contrast, in the whole sample, 
corruption, military involvement in politics, law and order, and bureaucracy quality do not 
appear to be associated with FDI flows.  
 
When developing countries only are included in the sample, investment profile continues to 
enter with significant estimates in all specifications, and corruption appears to matter more in 
developing countries as the size of its estimates is greater and significant in the two dynamic 
panel specifications. The Internal conflict component also seems to matter more for 
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developing countries. On the other hand, estimates of socioeconomic conditions and external 
conflict, which were significant when the whole sample was used, are no longer significant in 
any of the four specifications, while democratic accountability now enters with statistically 
significant estimates in the case of the partial adjustment model with fixed effects. 
 
Table 6 reports the effects of different components of financial risk on FDI, obtained from 
running 12 different regressions in four different specifications for the whole sample and for 
the sample of developing countries, respectively, while controlling for other variables 
specified above. Thus, the results come from 64 different regressions (= 8 X 4 X 2). 
 
It is somewhat surprising that among the eight different components of financial risk, only 
exchange rate stability (xr_stab) yields statistically significant positive estimates in the 
baseline model (both with fixed effects and with the dynamic GMM estimator) when 
estimated for developing countries only. In contrast, current account as a percentage of 
exports of goods and services (caxgs) enters with statistically significant negative coefficients 
in all specifications when the whole sample is used and in two specifications when the 
sample includes only the developing countries. This result suggests that greater amounts of 
FDI are attracted to the countries with greater current account deficit as a percentage of 
exports of goods and services. 
 
Foreign debt as a percentage of GDP (for_debt), net international liquidity as the number of 
months of import cover (intl_liq), and current account as a percentage of GDP (cacc) also 
yield negative coefficients in some specifications. 
 
Other financial risk variables that would appear to be important in firms’ investment 
decisions do not appear significant in determining FDI flows. Foreign debt service as a 
percentage of exports of goods and services (debt_serv), the three year average of inflation 
(inflation), and budget balance as a percentage of GDP (bud_bal) do not show any significant 
results in any specification. 
 
 
5. Summary and Policy Implications 
 
The link between political risk and FDI deserves special attention as such a link may be seen 
as one particular channel through which institutions are able to promote productivity growth 
(Acemoglu et al., 2005; Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2007). Indeed, good governance infrastructure 
exerts a positive influence on economic growth through the promotion of investment 
(domestic and foreign alike), while institutional underdevelopment and high country risk are 
key explanatory factors for the lack of foreign financing in the developing economies. 
 
There has, however, been no thorough and rigorous study to examine the impact of 
institutions and country risk on FDI flows. The purpose of this paper is to examine a much 
wider range of indicators, not only for political risk but also for financial risk, to identify the 
relative importance of these indicators for FDI flows after controlling for other relevant 
determinants of FDI flows. 
 
When the aggregate political risk index and the financial risk index are used in regression, a 
positive and highly significant coefficient is obtained for political risk, which suggests that 
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high political risk of host countries deters FDI inflows. In contrast, higher financial risk of 
host countries does not appear to have such a strong adverse effect on FDI inflows.  
 
We also find that among the 12 political risk components, government stability, 
socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, corruption, external conflict, 
religious tensions, democratic accountability, and ethnic tensions have close association with 
FDI flows. In particular, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, and external conflict 
seem to be the most influential components of political risk in attracting foreign investment. 
In contrast, military involvement in politics, law and order, and bureaucracy quality do not 
appear to be associated with FDI flows in the whole sample.  
 
On the other hand, among the eight components of financial risk, only exchange rate stability 
yields statistically significant positive estimates when estimated only for developing countries. 
In contrast, current account as a percentage of exports of goods and services, foreign debt as a 
percentage of GDP), net international liquidity as the number of months of import cover, and 
current account as a percentage of GDP yield negative coefficients in some specifications. 
 
Other financial risk variables that would appear to be important in firms’ investment 
decisions do not appear significant in determining FDI flows. Specifically, foreign debt 
service as a percentage of exports of goods and services, the three year average of inflation, 
and budget balance as a percentage of GDP do not show any significant results in any 
specification. Thus, multinationals do not seem to consider seriously the financial risk of the 
host country and hence, on the part of the host country, the benefit in reducing financial risk 
may be limited in attracting additional FDI, compared with the benefit in reducing political 
risk. 
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Table 1. Effects of Country Risk on FDI: Baseline Fixed Effects Model 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of Stock of FDI 0.535*** 0.593*** 0.469*** 0.469***
(0.093) (0.105) (0.150) (0.156)
Log of GDP per capita -0.154 -0.270 -0.038 0.025
(0.262) (0.282) (0.305) (0.349)
GDP per capita growth rate 0.159 0.136 0.272 0.207
(0.176) (0.180) (0.225) (0.234)
Log of total population 0.992 0.063 -0.240 0.049
(0.777) (0.893) (1.276) (1.324)
Population growth rate 2.528 0.344 -2.616 -4.594
(2.708) (2.610) (3.354) (3.348)
Degree of free trade 0.179*** 0.149** 0.245*** 0.194**
(0.059) (0.065) (0.074) (0.082)
Political risk 0.262*** 0.279***
(0.081) (0.103)
Financial risk -0.043 -0.133
(0.091) (0.114)
Constant -7.445 5.484 13.174 7.583
(14.002) (15.707) (23.609) (24.066)
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 93 93 60 60
Number of observations 337 323 212 204
R2 0.691 0.694 0.687 0.692
All countries Developing countries
Notes: Shown in parentheses are standard errors. ***, **, and * denote one, five,
and ten percent level of significance, respectively.
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Table 2. Effects of Country Risk on FDI: Baseline Dynamic GMM Model  
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of FDI inflows (t-1) 0.257** 0.225 0.427*** 0.428***
(0.122) (0.137) (0.128) (0.151)
Log of GDP per capita 0.522** 0.429* 0.382 0.375
(0.212) (0.255) (0.254) (0.288)
GDP per capita growth rate 0.096 0.010 0.025 -0.045
(0.145) (0.163) (0.237) (0.245)
Log of total population 0.579 0.461 0.728** 0.619**
(0.440) (0.449) (0.288) (0.243)
Population growth rate 3.168 1.954 -1.304 -3.294
(2.661) (2.664) (2.265) (2.598)
Degree of free trade 0.098 0.078 0.083 0.021
(0.065) (0.076) (0.086) (0.089)
Political risk 0.269*** 0.218*
(0.093) (0.117)
Financial risk -0.077 0.006
(0.107) (0.106)
Constant 0.504 3.950 -3.657 -2.029
(7.730) (7.549) (5.585) (4.676)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Arellano-Bond test
   AR(1) -2.971 -2.469 -1.676 -1.622
      p-value 0.003 0.014 0.094 0.105
   AR(2) 1.819 0.915 0.682 0.158
      p-value 0.069 0.360 0.495 0.874
Overidentification test (Sagan)
   Chi-squared 10.877 12.843 1.039 1.703
      p-value 0.054 0.025 0.959 0.889
Number of observations 322 313 202 197
Number of groups 93 93 60 60
All countries Developing countries
Notes: Shown in parentheses are standard errors. ***, **, and * denote one, five,
and ten percent level of significance, respectively.
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Table 3. Effects of Country Risk on FDI Inflows: Partial Adjustment Fixed Effects 
Model 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of FDI inflows (t-1) -0.977*** -0.968*** -0.962*** -0.931***
(0.064) (0.070) (0.076) (0.080)
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 0.357 0.538* 0.480 0.770**
(0.267) (0.317) (0.314) (0.367)
GDP per capita (d) 0.486** 0.420 0.657*** 0.711**
(0.218) (0.259) (0.246) (0.288)
Log of total population (t-1) -0.529 0.520 -0.438 0.888
(0.910) (1.041) (1.293) (1.396)
Population (d) 0.117 -1.082 -6.362* -7.126*
(3.070) (3.226) (3.697) (3.815)
Degree of free trade (t-1) 0.155** 0.222** 0.196** 0.236**
(0.074) (0.089) (0.093) (0.101)
Degree of free trade (d) 0.168*** 0.180** 0.161** 0.183**
(0.064) (0.074) (0.076) (0.084)
Political risk (t-1) 0.163 0.291**
(0.111) (0.122)
Political risk (d) 0.244*** 0.244**
(0.089) (0.108)
Financial risk (t-1) -0.201 -0.339**
(0.128) (0.157)
Financial risk (d) -0.107 -0.195*
(0.099) (0.113)
Constant 24.295 5.558 21.843 -2.327
(15.782) (18.127) (22.464) (24.065)
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 89 89 56 56
Number of observations 312 294 193 183
R2 0.564 0.567 0.636 0.648
All countries Developing countries
Notes: Shown in parentheses are standard errors. ***, **, and * denote one, five, and
ten percent level of significance, respectively.
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Table 4. Effects of Country Risk on FDI Inflows: Partial Adjustment Dynamic GMM 
Model 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of FDI inflows (t-1) 0.325** 0.261** 0.391*** 0.393***
(0.127) (0.129) (0.138) (0.151)
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 0.473** 0.556** 0.455* 0.538
(0.189) (0.222) (0.262) (0.358)
GDP per capita (d) 0.644*** 0.513* 0.512** 0.404
(0.210) (0.263) (0.218) (0.301)
Log of total population (t-1) 0.424 0.763** 0.574** 0.758**
(0.390) (0.375) (0.266) (0.350)
Population (d) 4.916* 2.205 -1.566 -4.278*
(2.547) (2.766) (2.457) (2.588)
Degree of free trade (t-1) -0.001 0.156 0.020 0.110
(0.085) (0.103) (0.114) (0.129)
Degree of free trade (d) 0.089 0.127* 0.062 0.056
(0.069) (0.075) (0.085) (0.092)
Political risk (t-1) 0.131 0.208
(0.127) (0.171)
Political risk (d) 0.232** 0.214*
(0.091) (0.114)
Financial risk (t-1) -0.233 -0.196
(0.182) (0.211)
Financial risk (d) -0.135 -0.083
(0.121) (0.131)
Constant 3.710 -2.230 -0.585 -3.847
(7.209) (6.027) (5.502) (7.176)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Arellano-Bond test
   AR(1) -2.811 -2.501 -1.623 -1.571
      p-value 0.005 0.012 0.105 0.116
   AR(2) 1.682 0.937 0.612 -0.119
      p-value 0.093 0.349 0.540 0.905
Overidentification test (Sagan)
   Chi-squared 12.682 10.186 0.993 2.212
      p-value 0.027 0.070 0.963 0.819
Number of observations 312 294 193 183
Number of groups 89 89 56 56
All countries Developing countries
Notes: Shown in parentheses are standard errors. ***, **, and * denote one, five, and
ten percent level of significance, respectively.
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Table 5. Effects of Different Components of Political Risk in Different Models 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
gov_stab socioec inv_prof int_conf ext_conf corruption military religion law_order ethnic_ten dem_acct bur_qual
0.075 0.115*** 0.063* 0.102** 0.101** 0.035 0.039 0.041 0.052 0.061* -0.004 -0.019
(0.047) (0.038) (0.038) (0.040) (0.044) (0.042) (0.034) (0.040) (0.041) (0.036) (0.034) (0.034)
0.085* 0.120*** 0.083** 0.003 0.095* 0.046 0.004 0.061 0.014 0.036 0.033 -0.032
(0.046) (0.039) (0.039) (0.045) (0.050) (0.055) (0.035) (0.037) (0.042) (0.044) (0.029) (0.039)
-0.043 0.064 0.069 0.067 0.017 -0.009 0.050 -0.031 0.041 0.007 0.063 0.013
(0.067) (0.060) (0.054) (0.054) (0.056) (0.059) (0.043) (0.052) (0.053) (0.050) (0.045) (0.045)
0.016 0.102** 0.071* 0.063 0.080* 0.007 0.036 0.045 0.043 0.007 0.060* -0.016
(0.049) (0.041) (0.039) (0.043) (0.047) (0.043) (0.040) (0.043) (0.043) (0.040) (0.036) (0.040)
-0.011 0.059 0.031 0.005 0.056 0.028 0.022 -0.033 -0.010 0.038 0.024 0.020
(0.091) (0.055) (0.063) (0.069) (0.057) (0.066) (0.044) (0.053) (0.059) (0.060) (0.045) (0.053)
0.041 0.101*** 0.061 0.012 0.101* 0.041 0.015 0.057* 0.006 0.024 0.043 -0.023
(0.054) (0.039) (0.041) (0.048) (0.053) (0.054) (0.037) (0.034) (0.043) (0.047) (0.029) (0.042)
0.080 0.026 0.084* 0.084* 0.072 0.085 0.035 0.041 0.033 0.047 0.045 -0.017
(0.061) (0.060) (0.049) (0.049) (0.055) (0.053) (0.038) (0.049) (0.051) (0.045) (0.040) (0.037)
0.034 0.008 0.089* 0.029 0.085 0.141** -0.012 0.046 0.032 0.031 0.034 0.011
(0.054) (0.049) (0.046) (0.048) (0.062) (0.064) (0.035) (0.040) (0.050) (0.050) (0.035) (0.042)
0.059 -0.012 0.145** 0.134** 0.044 0.102 0.057 -0.036 0.065 0.037 0.104** 0.029
(0.093) (0.092) (0.065) (0.058) (0.066) (0.071) (0.045) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.052) (0.047)
0.065 0.001 0.098** 0.081* 0.074 0.080 0.009 0.045 0.033 -0.001 0.079* -0.008
(0.063) (0.061) (0.048) (0.048) (0.057) (0.054) (0.044) (0.051) (0.054) (0.047) (0.041) (0.043)
0.081 -0.002 0.144* 0.036 0.045 0.150* 0.015 -0.013 0.052 0.016 0.014 0.028
(0.109) (0.103) (0.080) (0.075) (0.066) (0.078) (0.051) (0.065) (0.066) (0.073) (0.065) (0.052)
0.044 -0.002 0.102** 0.030 0.081 0.144** -0.005 0.043 0.023 0.014 0.038 0.008
(0.064) (0.057) (0.049) (0.049) (0.059) (0.067) (0.036) (0.037) (0.050) (0.051) (0.037) (0.040)
Ffixed effects model
Dynamic GMM
Political risk (t)
Political risk (t-1)
Political risk (d)
Political risk (t)
Political risk (t-1)
Political risk (d)
Notes: Shown here are point paremeters estimated for each component of political risk in four different models. Shown in parentheses are standard errors. ***, **, and * denote one, five, and ten percent level of
significance, respectively.
Political risk (d)
Dynamic GMM
Political risk (t-1)
Political risk (d)
All countries
Developing
countries only
Ffixed effects model Political risk (t)
Dynamic GMM Political risk (t)
Ffixed effects model
Political risk (t-1)
Ffixed effects model
Dynamic GMM
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Table 6. Effects of Different Components of Financial Risk in Different Models 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
for_debt xr_stab debt_serv caxgs int_liq inflation bud_bal cacc
0.019 0.031 0.023 -0.107* -0.049** -0.047 0.012 0.017
(0.037) (0.033) (0.042) (0.060) (0.024) (0.049) (0.044) (0.048)
0.036 0.024 -0.007 -0.098* -0.023 -0.033 0.007 0.010
(0.038) (0.031) (0.039) (0.056) (0.027) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046)
-0.092* -0.002 0.011 -0.200** 0.002 0.081 -0.019 -0.081
(0.051) (0.048) (0.065) (0.093) (0.034) (0.064) (0.066) (0.069)
-0.034 0.024 0.027 -0.124** -0.025 -0.013 0.029 -0.021
(0.038) (0.034) (0.048) (0.062) (0.026) (0.052) (0.046) (0.051)
-0.057 -0.008 -0.034 -0.152 -0.020 0.061 -0.105 -0.097
(0.067) (0.060) (0.066) (0.109) (0.037) (0.071) (0.086) (0.081)
0.028 0.019 0.012 -0.123** -0.032 -0.033 -0.027 -0.029
(0.044) (0.036) (0.041) (0.058) (0.027) (0.051) (0.056) (0.054)
0.015 0.079* -0.053 -0.106 -0.022 -0.008 -0.056 -0.054
(0.047) (0.041) (0.055) (0.069) (0.032) (0.058) (0.057) (0.059)
0.032 0.057* -0.010 -0.081 0.042 0.050 -0.057 -0.022
(0.053) (0.034) (0.049) (0.057) (0.027) (0.052) (0.051) (0.047)
-0.087 0.033 -0.139 -0.221** 0.018 0.062 -0.100 -0.148*
(0.063) (0.069) (0.085) (0.099) (0.044) (0.073) (0.083) (0.087)
-0.050 0.057 -0.086 -0.141** -0.001 -0.008 -0.069 -0.109*
(0.047) (0.043) (0.062) (0.067) (0.031) (0.058) (0.058) (0.062)
-0.057 0.040 -0.076 -0.129 0.053 0.095 -0.113 -0.087
(0.079) (0.065) (0.098) (0.103) (0.048) (0.068) (0.109) (0.105)
0.009 0.046 -0.005 -0.110* 0.036 0.035 -0.074 -0.070
(0.057) (0.041) (0.056) (0.058) (0.028) (0.055) (0.064) (0.063)
Political risk (t)
Ffixed effects model Political risk (t)
Dynamic GMM Political risk (t)
Ffixed effects model
Political risk (t-1)
Political risk (d)
All countries
Developing
countries only
Notes: Shown here are point paremeters estimated for each component of financial risk in four different models. Shown in parentheses are standard errors. ***,
**, and * denote one, five, and ten percent level of significance, respectively.
Ffixed effects model
Political risk (t-1)
Political risk (d)
Dynamic GMM
Political risk (t-1)
Political risk (d)
Dynamic GMM
Political risk (t-1)
Political risk (d)
Ffixed effects model Political risk (t)
Dynamic GMM
 
 
 
Appendix 1: List of countries  
 
 
  
Developed countries (33)
Algeria Morocco Australia
Argentina Mozambique Austria
Bangladesh Nicaragua Belgium
Bolivia Nigeria Canada
Brazil Pakistan Czech Republic
Bulgaria Panama Denmark
Cameroon Papua New Guinea Finland
Chile Paraguay France
China Peru Germany
Colombia Philippines Greece
Congo, Republic of Romania Hong Kong
Costa Rica Russian Federation Hungary
Cote d`Ivoire Senegal Iceland
Dominican Republic South Africa Ireland
Ecuador Sri Lanka Israel
Egypt Syria Italy
El Salvador Tanzania Japan
Ethiopia Thailand Korea, Republic of
Gabon Togo Luxembourg
Ghana Tunisia Netherlands
Guatemala Turkey New Zealand
Guyana Uganda Norway
Haiti Uruguay Poland
Honduras Venezuela Portugal
India Viet Nam Singapore
Indonesia Zambia Slovakia
Iran Zimbabwe Spain
Jamaica Sweden
Jordan Switzerland
Kenya Trinidad &Tobago
Malaysia United Arab Emirates
Mexico United Kingdom
Mongolia United States
Developing countries (60)
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Appendix 2: ICRG Methodology 
 
A. The Political Risk Rating 
The aim of the political risk rating is to provide a means of assessing the political stability of 
the countries covered by ICRG on a comparable basis.  
The following risk components, weights, and sequence are used to produce the political risk 
rating: 
 
 
POLITICAL RISK COMPONENTS
Abbreviation Component Points 
(max.) 
 
Gov_stab Government Stability 12 
Socioec Socioeconomic Conditions 12 
Inv_prof Investment Profile 12 
Int_conf Internal Conflict 12 
Ext_conf External Conflict 12 
Corruption Corruption 6 
Military Military in Politics 6 
Religion Religious Tensions 6 
Law_order Law and Order 6 
Ethnic_ten Ethnic Tensions 6 
Dem_acct Democratic Accountability 6 
Bur_qual Bureaucracy Quality 4 
Total 100 
Government Stability  
This is an assessment both of the government’s ability to carry out its declared program(s) 
and of its ability to stay in office. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents:  
• Government Unity 
• Legislative Strength 
• Popular Support 
Socioeconomic Conditions  
This is an assessment of the socioeconomic pressures at work in society that could constrain 
government action or fuel social dissatisfaction. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three 
subcomponents:  
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• Unemployment 
• Consumer Confidence 
• Poverty 
Investment Profile   
This is an assessment of factors affecting the risk to investment that are not covered by other 
political, economic, and financial risk components. The risk rating assigned is the sum of 
three subcomponents: 
• Contract Viability/Expropriation 
• Profits Repatriation 
• Payment Delays 
Internal Conflict   
This is an assessment of political violence in the country and its actual or potential impact on 
governance. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents: 
• Civil War/Coup Threat 
• Terrorism/Political Violence 
• Civil Disorder 
External Conflict  
This is an assessment of the risk to the incumbent government from foreign action, ranging 
from non-violent external pressure (diplomatic pressures, withholding of aid, trade 
restrictions, territorial disputes, sanctions, etc.) to violent external pressure (cross-border 
conflict to all-out war). The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents: 
• War 
• Cross-Border Conflict 
• Foreign Pressures 
Corruption   
This is an assessment of corruption within the political system. 
Military in Politics  
This is an assessment of military involvement in politics. 
Religious Tensions  
Religious tensions may stem from the domination of society and/or governance by a single 
religious group that seeks to replace civil law by religious law and to exclude other religions 
from the political and/or social process; the desire of a single religious group to dominate 
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governance; the suppression of religious freedom; and the desire of a religious group to 
express its own identity separate from the country as a whole. 
The risk involved in these situations ranges from inexperienced people imposing 
inappropriate policies through civil dissent to civil war. 
Law and Order  
The risk rating assigned is the sum of two subcomponents, which quantify the strength and 
impartiality of the legal system: 
• Law 
• Order 
Ethnic Tensions  
This is an assessment of the degree of tension attributable to racial, nationality, or language 
divisions.  
Democratic Accountability  
This is a measure of how responsive government is to its people, on the basis that the less 
responsive it is, the more likely it is that the government will fall, peacefully in a democratic 
society but possibly violently in a non-democratic one. 
Bureaucracy Quality  
This is a measure of whether the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without 
drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services.  
 
 
B. The Economic Risk Rating 
The overall aim of the Economic Risk Rating is to provide a means of assessing a country’s 
current economic strengths and weaknesses. In general terms, where its strengths outweigh its 
weaknesses it will present a low economic risk and where its weaknesses outweigh its 
strengths it will present a high economic risk. 
The following risk components, weights, and sequence are used to produce the economic risk 
rating: 
 
 
 
ECONOMIC RISK COMPONENTS
Sequence Component Points 
(max.) 
 
A GDP per Head 5 
B Real GDP Growth 10 
C Annual Inflation Rate 10 
D Budget Balance as a Percentage of GDP 10 
E Current Account as a Percentage of GDP 15 
Total 50 
 
 
 
C. The Financial Risk Rating 
The overall aim of the Financial Risk Rating is to provide a means of assessing a country’s 
ability to pay its way. In essence, this requires a system of measuring a country’s ability to 
finance its official, commercial, and trade debt obligations. 
The following risk components, weights, and sequence are used to produce the financial risk 
rating: 
 
FINANCIAL RISK COMPONENTS
Sequence Component Points 
(max.) 
A Foreign Debt as a Percentage of GDP 10 
B 
Foreign Debt Service as a 
Percentage of Exports of Goods 
and Services 
10 
C Current Account as a Percentage of Exports of Goods and Services 15 
D Net International Liquidity as Months of Import Cover 5 
E Exchange Rate Stability 10 
Total 50 
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